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Moving Beyond Consent for Citizen Science in Big Data Health Research 
 
 
Anne SY Cheung 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Consent has been the cornerstone of personal data privacy regime. 1  It 
authorizes the collection, use and process of personal data. When it comes to health 
and medical research, consent is a prerequisite for the intervention to one’s body, the 
collection of bio-specimens and the use of personal data. The doctrine of consent is 
premised on the liberal tenets of individual autonomy, dignity and integrity, rooted in 
the fundamental respect to a person and intertwined with the right to respect for 
privacy.
2
 More important, consent is only meaningful if it is freely given (voluntary), 
specific and informed (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2011, 29).  
The above concern is particularly pertinent to citizen science in health and 
medical research, in which the nature of research is often data intensive with serious 
implications for individual’s privacy and other interests. Although there is no standard 
definition for citizen science, the European Commission has highlighted its general 
features to be the gathering and volunteering of data by non-professionals, and the 
participation of non-experts in analysis and scientific experimentation, with public 
input into research and project. 3  Citizens become experimenters, stakeholders, 
purveyors of data, research participants or even partners in the process.4 Consent from 
                                                        
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Privacy Framework 2013 at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf. 
2 (Beauchamp and Childress 2012, 107) 
3 (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 2015, 23). 
4 By citizens as experimenters, this refers to patients participating in various degrees in 
experimentation; as stakeholders refers to patient expert groups; as purveyors of data refers to citizens 
or patients sending data through digital devices, mobile devices and other information communication 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943185 
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citizen scientists is indispensable as it is a constitutive element for self-determination 
and self-empowerment for participants. Furthermore, consent from participants as 
data subjects determines the responsibility and accountability of data users. Under 
orthodox understanding, consent should be given on a one-on-one basis, for a “single 
study at a single institution for a specific purpose”(Kuehn 2013). 
While all these may sound sensible and reasonable, technology always 
produces new directions and challenges for research. With the advancement in 
information technology and data analytics, bio-medical and health research have 
become data-intensive, global and virtual (Schmietow 2016, 197). Bio-banks and 
virtual research repositories are gaining prominence and significance (Auffray et al. 
2016). At the same time, the risk inherent in health science research and big data 
technology has often extended beyond the existing data. In addition, the use and 
transfer of data for other unforeseen purposes is often outside the control of the 
original research team. Plus, risks and harm of subsequent data use may not be known 
at the time of data collection. Hence, consent becomes problematic because the 
traditional standard and understanding on consent that one can fully specify the terms 
of agreement in advance becomes questionable in big data science and citizen science. 
 We cannot help but ask: is consent still valid? Should it still be one of the 
critical criteria in citizen science health research which is collaborative and 
contributory by nature? While the big data challenge is not unique to citizen science 
health and medical research, the inherent sensitivity of health data exacerbates the 
problem which calls for close scrutiny of the doctrine of consent. With a focus on 
citizen science health and medical data research, this study examines the doctrine of 
consent and its inadequacies. It then analyzes the alternative and adaptive models of 
                                                                                                                                                              
technology. (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European 
Commission 2015, 25). 
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“open consent” 5  and “dynamic consent”(Kaye et al. 2015). Facing the challenges 
that big data and citizen science pose to personal data protection and privacy, this 
article explores the legal, social and ethical concerns behind consent. It argues that 
navigating one’s way through different models of consent and the varied choices in 
consent forms can be a legal minefield. We need to move beyond the consent 
paradigm into a broader framework of accountability, taking into consideration of 
harm and risk assessment. Ultimately, what lies behind consent are the entailing 
values of autonomy, fairness and propriety in the name of research.  
 
I. Citizen Science and Big Data Health Research 
We begin our discussion by looking at the nature of citizen science. In the 
mid-1990s, Alan Irwin popularized and prompted the discussion on citizen science 
(Prainsack 2014). By which, Irwin refers to the examination of the relationship 
between citizens and science, including science that assists citizens’ needs and 
concerns, and science developed and enacted by citizens themselves (Irwin 1995, xi). 
Irwin flags up the need to face up the challenges posed by risks in scientific research 
and sustainable development.6  
By the 21
st
 century, citizen science has developed into different forms of 
participation by non-professional scientists, exhibiting various dimensions in the co-
operation between professionals and non-professionals, opening up multiple levels of 
engagements in the area of health sector. At one end of the spectrum, there is citizen 
led, patient owned initiatives of sharing quantitative information, exchanging 
experience on treatment and searching for the right clinical trials on online platforms. 
                                                        
5 (Angrist 2009). 
6  Irwin’s case study was mainly on environmental development.  
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Prominent examples include PatientslikeMe,7 CureLauncher8 and CureTogether.9 At 
the other end of the spectrum, there is commercial or government led research. For 
instance, Sage Bionetworks took advantage of smartphone based health technology to 
study the lifestyle of 17,000 Parkinson’s disease patients in 2015.10 It also paired up 
with Apple ResearchKit to study the life quality of 60,000 breast cancer survivors.11    
In the same year, US President Obama announced the nationwide US$215 million 
Precision Medicine Initiative to build a large-scale research enterprise between public 
and private sectors, calling for one million volunteers to contribute their health data so 
as to extend precision medicine to all diseases (The White House 2015).  In between 
the two models, there is a third one catering for joint collaboration between citizens 
and health professionals in creating knowledge. Prominent example includes the 
Sarroch Bioteca Foundation founded in 2012 in pursuant of a “citizen veillance on 
health” project in Italy (Tallacchini, Boucher, and Nascimento 2014).  The project 
was launched by the Sarroch municipality in 2006 to gather biological samples 
donated by citizens so as to monitor genetic changes as health indicators in relation to 
the environment. All citizens of the municipality were invited to become members of 
the project. The aim was to use science for policy in the regulation health and 
institutional implementation. The Sarroch example was seen as a joint effort for 
collective governance and a model for democratic health choice.12 
Regardless of the level of citizen involvement, the degree of participation, or 
the form of co-operation in the above models as contractual, contributory, 
                                                        
7 https://www.patientslikeme.com 
8 http://curelauncher.com 
9 http://curetogether.com 
10 (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 2015). 
11 (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 2015). 
12 (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 2015, 
28). 
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collaborative, co-creative or collegial,13 data privacy of research subjects and security 
issues will be triggered whenever citizens have contributed their data or biospecimens 
to the projects. Following the contemporary new wave of citizen science research in 
big data is a whole new set of legal and ethical concerns. First, we are witnessing 
unprecedented scale of online crowd sourcing, with researchers pooling data together 
using big data capture strategies and data analytics (Rothstein, Wilbanks, and 
Brothers 2015). As progress of research often extends beyond the existing data, big 
data technology use and transfer of data for other unforeseen purposes is often outside 
the control of the original research team. Second, despite promise of data de-
identification, third parties can match data sets to re-identify individuals (Sweeney 
1997). Third, with the advancement of data mining and big data technologies, risks 
and harm of subsequent data use may not be known at the time of data collection and 
use. Namely, researchers of existing team or even third parties can match data sets to 
re-identify individuals. For instance, large scale harvesting of health data can reveal 
unnoticed correlations between lifestyle and medical conditions of individuals, which 
are important information to insurance companies (“Tech Companies See Market 
Opportunity in Healthcare Innovation” 2016). In other words, consent becomes 
problematic in citizen science research especially in the big data era. The model that 
one can fully disclose and specify the terms of notice and consent at the outset has 
become illusory.  
 
                                                        
13 The typology of the five project models is formulated by Shirk and her colleagues. Contractual 
projects refer to communities asking professional researchers to conduct a specific investigation and 
report; contributory projects refer to those designed by scientists, with citizens contributing data; 
collaborative projects is similar to contributory project except with citizens helping to refine project 
design, analyze data or disseminate findings; co-created projects are jointly designed by scientists and 
citizens, in which some citizens are actively involved in most or all aspects of the research process; and 
collegial contributions refer to non-credential individuals conducting research independently with 
varying degrees of expected recognition by the professional scientists. (Shirk et al. 2012) 
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II. Rethinking Consent 
  Consent has been a cardinal doctrine in clinical treatment and research. It is 
premised on the respect for individual autonomy which embodies the principle of 
self-rule that is free from “controlling interference by others and limitations that 
prevent meaningful choice”(Beauchamp and Childress 2012, 101). It is enshrined in 
numerous international treaties, legal guidelines and code. 14  Namely, on the 
protection of human rights, the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) stipulates that “free consent” is a prerequisite for medical and scientific 
experimentation.15 On personal data, the General Data Protection Regulations (GDRP) 
of the European Union states that “explicit consent” is necessary for the processing of 
genetic, biometric and health data. 16  On experiments done by physicians, the 
Nuremberg Code sets the standards to which physicians must conform when carrying 
out experiments on human subjects which requires the obtaining of consent and the 
ascertainment of competence from human subject in experiments. 17  On medical 
research, the Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical Association calls for 
“informed consent, preferably in written form” from physicians. 18 Again, on bio-
                                                        
14 For an historical overview, see  (Meier 2002)   For further comparison of global guidelines on 
consent and informed consent, see (Bhutta 2004) 
15 Article 7 of the ICCPR “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation.” (ICCPR 1976) 
16 Article 9 of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR).  In addition to article 9, article 7 of 
the GDPR requires that the request for data subject’s consent must be clearly distinguishable, 
intelligible, easily accessible, and expressed in clear and plain language.  The GDPR will come into 
force in 2018 ( Articles 94 and 99 of the GDPR). Regulation 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, General Data Protection Regulation, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L119/1, 27 April 2016 at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/reform/files/regulation_oj_en.pdf. 
17 Article 1 of the Nuremberg Code states that  “ the voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential . . . [and includes] legal capacity . . . free power of choice . . . sufficient knowledge 
and comprehension of the [nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment] . . . to make an 
understanding and enlightened decision.” The Nuremberg Code (1947) at 
http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/nuremberg/. 
18 WMA Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects 
Promulgated in 1964 and revised eight times since.  Article 26 states that  the physician should obtain 
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medicine study, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine calls for “free and 
informed” consent; 19  and the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research Involving Human Subjects insists that investigators must obtain the 
“voluntary informed consent of the prospective subject …and that waiver of informed 
consent is to be regarded as uncommon and exceptional and must in all cases be 
approved by an ethical review committee.”20 On research involving human subjects in 
general, the US Code of Federal Regulation specifies that informed consent from 
participants in research must involve discussion of the nature of the involved 
procedure, its risks and benefits, and alternative treatments available.
 21 This then 
must be concluded with the free assent from participants.22 
 Regardless whether it is free, explicit, informed and voluntary, the four 
essential elements of a valid consent are comprehension or understanding, voluntary 
participation, competence and disclosure (Sreenivasan 2003). While the first three 
refer to the duty of doctors or researchers to obtain the voluntary agreement of human 
subjects before participation, the last one refers to their duty to disclose adequate 
information to the subjects.23 Both limbs are integrated requirements of consent as a 
single legal and moral doctrine.24 Seemingly, the above frameworks in international 
and national law, codes and guidelines have provided the necessary and sufficient 
legal basis for informed consent and for the use of one’s data or bio-specimens. But 
                                                                                                                                                              
the “subject's freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing” at 
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/ 
19 Council of Europe, Article 5 of the (Council of Europe 1997) 
20 Guideline 4 of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Science (2002) published in 
1993, and since revised. Investigators must obtain the “voluntary, informed consent” of the prospective 
subject [or legally authorized representative]. . . . Waiver of informed consent is to be regarded as 
uncommon and exceptional, and must in all cases be approved by an ethical review committee.” at 
http://www.cioms.ch/publications/guidelines/guidelines_nov_2002_blurb.htm 
21  §46.116 Code of Federal Regulations, TITLE 45 PUBLIC WELFARE DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES PART 46 PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS (Revised 
January 15, 2009, Effective July 14, 2009). 
22 §46.116 Code of Federal Regulations. 
23 §46.116 Code of Federal Regulations. 
24 §46.116 Code of Federal Regulations. 
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how detailed should description of the research be and how much disclosure would be 
required as adequate remains controversial. 
 In the context of data-driven citizen science research, participants have to face 
the additional uncertainty and unpredictability of research progress.  For example, in 
the 1980s, a group of Canavan-disease affected families developed a disease registry 
and tissue bank to encourage research in the area.25 They provided tissue for research 
on the disease and aided in the identification of other affected families.26 With three 
nonprofit organizations, they developed a confidential database and Canavan disease 
registry, which had attracted financial sponsorship. However, when one of the chosen 
physician-researcher decided to isolate and patent the Canavan gene sequence and 
developed genetic screening tests for it, the families sued the researcher and his 
institution.27  The bitter legal battle ended only in half victory. The U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida dismissed several of the plaintiffs' claims, 
including lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment 
of the patent, and misappropriation of trade secrets. Nevertheless, the court upheld the 
claim of unjust enrichment made by the donors of tissue, on the grounds that "the 
facts paint a picture of a continuing research collaboration that involved Plaintiffs also 
investing time and significant resources."28  
 In more recent times, another notorious example is the 23andMe project. It 
started out in late 2007 as a company offering genetic testing at a very low price of 
US$299, giving out spit-kits and asking for saliva samples (Seife 2016). The way of 
                                                        
25 Canavan disease is a progressive, fatal neurological disorder that begins in infancy. It is caused by an 
inherited genetic abnormality resulting in improper transmission of nerve signals. Canavan Foundation, 
Canavan Disease, http://www.canavanfoundation.org/about_canavan_disease. For discussion of the 
dispute, see (Evans 2016). 
26 Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute.264 F. Supp. 2d  1064. 
27 Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute.264 F. Supp. 2d  1064. 
28 Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute.264 F. Supp. 2d  1064.    . 
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testing was perceived as a “fun way” to learn about one’s genetics. 29  In 2008, 
23andMe added a new research feature named 23andWe which played up citizen 
science rhetoric, emphasizing on strong participatory features.30 It invited customers 
and participants to vote for disease that the company promised that they would then 
prioritize in their research.31 In turn, the customers and participants were asked to 
contribute their lifestyle and other relevant information for research purpose. By that 
time, the company had offered free spit kits to people who had been diagnosed with 
the type of disease that the company would like to focus and to do research.32 The 
price of spit-kit had also been lowered to US$99.33 By 2012, 23andMe had about 
15,000 users.34 The mode of business operation was a commercial company that drew 
heavily on the participation of citizen scientist. Patients and members of patient 
support groups joined under the impression that they were contributing their genetic 
and personal data for the development of treatment and long term research. However, 
they were soon to wake up to reality when the company filed a number of patent 
applications later in 2012.35 People also came to realize that 23andMe was sharing 
aggregate data about its customers and participants to third parties, and Google has 
been investing in the company. 36  Consequently, the company was under severe 
criticism but defended that it had informed the customers and participants all along in 
their Terms of Services and consent forms.37 Although what 23andMe had done was 
technically lawful, Barbara Prainsack pointed out that it was dishonest and immoral 
                                                        
29 Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute.264 F. Supp. 2d  1064. 
30 (Prainsack 2014, 156). 
31 (Prainsack 2014, 156). 
32 (Prainsack 2014, 156). 
33 (Seife 2016). 
34 (Prainsack 2014, 156). 
35 (Prainsack 2014). 
36 In fact, the founder of the company, Anne Wojcicki, was the wife of Google-boss Sergey Brin at that 
time. (Prainsack 2014, 158); (Seife 2016). 
37 (Prainsack 2014). 
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for the company to capitalize on the “free labour” and data capital of its customers, 
patients and participants for profit earning under the grand name of research.38 In 
particular, Prainsack observed that the business model of citizen science in 23andMe 
was “continually evolving.”39 It was highly unlikely that the participants could keep 
up with the frequent modifications of the Terms of Service and have read the fast 
changing, constantly updated terms in small print on the website.40 
 What the above two incidents have illustrated is that there is misalignment of 
orientations between citizen science participants and expert researchers. The former 
group was motivated by a genuine commitment to facilitate disease research, to 
contribute to health knowledge and to create collective benefits. In contrast, the latter 
was motivated by profit earning, and individual or corporate success. Yet, this mis-
match might not be present at the outset of research projects. Rather, it is due to the 
fluid and flexible nature of health and medical data research and citizen science that 
the projects soon spin out of control of the citizen science participants and evolve 
beyond their own meanings.  
In addition to the problem of expert researchers gradually growing apart from 
their research subjects, one may also notice that the relation between expert 
researchers and participants is not on a traditional model of one-to-one basis. Instead, 
it is rested on an elaborate network backed by complex organization structure, and 
staffed by different experts at various levels. Citizen scientists or participants 
motivated by altruism to share their personal data mistakenly thought they could 
retain some form of control in a collaborative or cooperative manner. 41  Their 
                                                        
38 (Prainsack 2014). 
39 (Prainsack 2014, 157). 
40 (Prainsack 2014). 
41 (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 2015, 
52). 
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solidarity, sadly, was later exploited by researchers or commercial groups in both 
public and private spheres.  
Furthermore, if informed consent requires disclosure by researchers and 
comprehension by participants, full disclosure of information will become neither 
definable nor achievable at the outset of the research due to the fast changing nature 
of research which is heavily dependent on data analytics. Writing on clinical 
treatment and research, Onora O’Neil has remarked on the inherent deficiency of 
informed consent as a doctrine (O’Neil 2002, 42–43). She explains that this is not due 
to any deficiencies in the procedures to ensure informed consent has been fulfilled, 
but more to the fact that consent is a “propositional attitude.”42 It is a “description of 
a proposal” for treatment or research. 43  One can only consent to the specific 
descriptions of a proposition but may not be aware of the foreseeable consequences, 
or those entailed to it. 
 Does this then mean that informed consent is no longer valid? Alternatively, 
does it suggest it is high time for an urgent refinement of the requirement of consent? 
Mittelstadt and Foridi have argued that the traditional framework on informed consent 
“does not clearly transfer” to research involving biomedical big data (Mittelstadt and 
Floridi 2016, 311).  They point out this is because the doctrine of informed consent is 
formulated for single, specific research or treatment but not for the sharing, 
aggregating or repurposing of data that may reveal unforeseen information.44 As a 
result, until we have found a satisfactory alternative model, the pressing concerns on 
obtaining informed consent for citizen science research in health data remains to be: 
deciding the purposes the data are collected and the duration that the data will be kept; 
                                                        
42 (O’Neil 2002, 43). 
43 (O’Neil 2002, 43), emphasis by O’Neil. 
44 (Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016, 312). 
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identifying who is permitted to have access to the data and who is processing the data 
for what purposes; and determining what to do in case of misuse of data.45  
 
 
III. Re-negotiating Consent 
To tackle the above, different models on informed consent have been 
formulated by researchers in this area. Here, we evaluate the common forms of open 
and dynamic consent, including variations of the latter known as portable and meta 
consent. 
 
 
1. Open Consent 
In light of the inherent uncertainty and unpredictability of big data health 
research, some scholars have advocated for veracity or “radical honesty”(Wilbanks 
2014) in the model of “open consent,” which deliberately excludes any promises 
about privacy and requires participants to demonstrate comprehension of the nature of 
the research and the risks involved prior to enrollment.46  
This has been used in the famous Personal Genome Project (PGP) by Harvard 
University since 2005. 47  The aim of the project is to test DNA sequencing 
technologies on human subjects by building a database of human genomes and traits, 
with ambition to be a global network project.48 The nature of the database is open 
source, open access, and participatory and collaborative. The target is to collect the 
                                                        
45 (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 2015, 
53). 
46 (Ball et al. 2014). Other examples of open consent model include the Omics project, The Human 
Microbiome Project and the American Gut Project. See (European Group on Ethics in Science and 
New Technologies to the European Commission 2015, 14–16). 
47 http://www.personalgenomes.org/. 
48 At the time of writing, UK, Canada and Austria have joined the network. 
13 
 
genomes of 100,000 individuals and to make the information public with no serious 
effort at deidentifcation.49 Since DNA is the ultimate digital identifier of an individual 
but de-identification of samples would impoverish the data,50 the PGP research team 
has decided to be forthright and honest with the participants, aiming that they should 
be “truly informed” about the nature of the research. Participation by public is 
encouraged and volunteers are asked to give “open consent” to ensure that they 
understood the scientific nature of the experiment and that they also understood that 
privacy and confidentiality could not be guaranteed.  
Misha Angrist, being one of the original ten participants of the PGP back in 
2006, shared his experience and reflections. According to him, participants had to go 
through an eligibility screening process first which included filling out a questionnaire 
regarding family circumstances and privacy preferences.51 Second, they would review 
a study guide that covered the potential risks of participating. Third, they then took an 
“entrance exam” that covered the areas of how PGP worked, knowledge of genetics, 
ethical principles governing human subjects research; and their comfort level with 
having their genome and health records in the public domain. They had to score 100% 
in the exam before they could be enrolled in the project. Finally, they had to sign a 
consent form, which stated the possibility of reidentification, disclosure of 
nonpaternity and loss of insurance, among other risks of embarrassment, 
discrimination, data loss and any unforeseen problems. 
Participants were described as “co-drivers” of the project (Angrist 2009). 
They were expected to have solid knowledge about the field. Take Angrist as an 
example, he himself is a scientist working for an established institute for genome 
                                                        
49 (Angrist 2009). 
50 (Angrist 2009). 
51 (Angrist 2009). 
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science and policy. 52  He completed an early version of the entrance exam and 
suggested changes to certain questions, and questioned the rationale for specific 
analyses(Angrist 2009). He was also one of the three initial ten participants who 
served on the PGP Board of Directors(Angrist 2009). He was careful enough to carry 
out certain test on his genotypes and make sure the result was negative before 
deciding to make his cell line available to the public (Angrist 2009). However, it is 
doubtful how many other citizen scientists or participants could achieve such 
thorough understanding of the research and its implications to privacy. 
Other than the fact that the nature of research and open consent require 
advanced level of comprehension from citizen science participants, scholars have 
criticized that open consent is far from “true consent”(Caulfield, Upshur, and Daar 
2003). First, open consent does not allow participants to act meaningfully on their 
continuing interest in their own health data.53  Second, the way that it operates does 
not take prevention of harm or controlling use into account. Third, equally worse, the 
model is a distortion of informed consent as it does not include permission for 
unforeseen research, re-contact of subjects, the right to withdrawal, the setting of time 
limits on the use of data, the restriction of information or materials to third parties, 
and information on implications for groups and information on commercial uses.54 
Altogether, so called veracity has become an excuse to absolve researchers from 
accountability and responsibility. Although open consent maybe legally valid, its 
practice remains ethically vague and questionable. 
 
2. Dynamic Consent  
                                                        
52 Affiliated with Duke University Institute for Genome Sciences & Policy. Misha Angrist at 
https://sanford.duke.edu/people/faculty/angrist-misha. 
53 (Angrist 2009). 
54 (Greely 2001). 
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Rather than asking participants to take a leap of faith into uncertainty, a slightly 
refined model of “broad consent” has been proposed. While one gives consent to a 
framework for future research of certain types, ethical review of each specific 
research project by an independent ethics committee is required (Steinsbekk, Kåre 
Myskja, and Solberg 2013, 897). In addition, researchers must provide strategies on 
how to update regularly the participants and how to enable ongoing withdrawal 
opportunities for the participants. Examples of broad consent model research are the 
UK Biobank project and the Norwegian Mother Child Cohort Study.
55
 Nevertheless, 
regular updates to participants in ongoing research is seen as “extras” in this model 
(Kaye et al. 2015, 142). Thus, legal and ethical concerns have been raised as to 
whether broad consent is a form of genuine informed consent when participants are 
reduced to be passive subjects rather than research partners (Teare et al. 2015, 2). 
Approaching consent from a different perspective finally comes the alternative 
model of “dynamic consent.” It is a model tailor-made to the need of participants by 
utilizing online interface and information technology based platform. Information 
about specific use of personal data and tissue and requests for consent for such use 
will be put to the participants through online platform (Kaye et al. 2015).  
Participants are allowed to engage in an interactive personalized interface as much or 
as little as they choose and to alter their consent choices in real time (Kaye et al. 
2015, 142). Consent is seen as a process, an ongoing interaction between researchers 
and participants. Hence, consent becomes dynamic because it allows participants to 
interact with the researchers over time, to consent to new projects, to alter their 
consent choices in light of any new circumstances. This model was first designed for 
                                                        
55 (Kaye et al. 2015). 
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the EnCoRe project of three biobanks in Oxford (2008 to 2012).56 Another example is 
the Registries for All (Reg4All) project run by Genetic Alliance in partnership with 
the technology company Private Access (Mathews and Jamal 2014).  Reg4All 
allows participants to decide how their data are being used and shared with particular 
researchers, institutions, or people studying a specific disease. They will also be able 
to track who have used their data and how. 
Scholars praise the model of dynamic consent as providing “personalized 
communication interface for interacting with patients, participants and citizens”(Kaye 
et al. 2015, 142), implementing engagement 2.0 in the era of Web 2.0(Teare et al. 
2015, 1). Apparently, it enables consent to be given to multiple researchers and 
projects, to open-ended and ongoing research, and to the use of secondary research or 
down-streaming of data-use. Besides, dynamic consent has overcome the problem of 
locked in consent confined to one experimental procedure for granting autonomy, 
choice and control to individuals. In other words, participants can electronically 
control consent through time and receive information about the uses of their 
data(Williams et al. 2015). At the same time, researchers can also manage the 
necessity to re-contact and to seek “re-consent” participants much more easily. 
Understandably, dynamic consent as a participant-centric initiative has its special 
appeal. Refining the model of dynamic consent, there are further variations to it. 
 
(a) Portable Legal Consent (PLC) 
Another model is “portable legal consent” proposed by John Wilbanks of Sage 
Bionetworks (Wilbanks 2014).  Under this model, individuals are recognized that they 
have rights with respect to the data generated from their bodies. They therefore will 
                                                        
56 (Kaye et al. 2015, 145.) (Mont, Sharma, and Pearson 2012). 
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decide the kind of data that they would like to donate and share. For example, in the 
Sage Bionetworks, the suggested five categories are genetic sequence, clinical 
information, medical record, patient reported outcomes and personal sensor data.57  
Consent is not tied to any particular study but carried around by the participants like 
organ donation status (Kuehn 2013). In that sense, consent becomes portable and 
controllable. Obtaining consent will be done through an online interactive consent 
system. Participants can share their own data broadly in the public domain to serve 
scientific research regardless of the particular institution involved. They can easily 
change their consent status for future study or secondary use of data. In turn, the 
database of genomic information being collected through portable legal consent will 
be available to anyone who agrees to its terms. These include not to use the data to 
harm anyone or to identify the participants.58 Users also agree to publish their work 
based on open access policy.  
 
(b) Meta Consent 
Rather than focusing on the distinct categories of personal data, the meta consent 
model allows participants to express a preference for how and when to provide 
consent at a metal level, i.e. how and when they would like to be presented with a 
request for consent to the use of their personal health data and biological material 
(Ploug and Holm 2016, 724). In this model proposed by Ploug and Holm, 
participants must be provided with a predefined set of types of consent;59 a set of 
types of data;60 and a set of types of research contexts to choose from.61 
                                                        
57 (Wilbanks 2014, 248). 
58Sage Bionetworks, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.synapse.org/governance/SageBionetworksSynapseTermsandCondition
sofUse.pdf?v=4 
59 Ploug and Hom mention three types of consent. The first is specific consent referring to 
consent request for each new specific project using data, but not for each and every use of data. 
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While acknowledging similarities with dynamic consent, Ploug and Holm argue 
that meta consent is different in the sense that the model of dynamic consent is 
originally designed for bio-banks(Ploug and Holm 2016, n. 29). In contrast, meta 
consent is developed with the aim to handle and configure consent preferences for the 
entire population for all kinds of data and biological samples, with a vision that every 
citizen is a potential participant in big data research especially in medical 
research(Ploug and Holm 2016, n. 29). The meta consent model is designed “to 
provide a definitive answer by letting individuals design future consent requests on 
the basis of predefined types of consent, data and contexts”(Ploug and Holm 2016, n. 
29). 
 
3. Consent and its Limitation 
Regardless which variation or refinement of dynamic consent that one chooses, 
problems remain. First, dynamic consent is in essence an information governance 
model, which is useful only for the well informed, engaged and e-health literate 
participants (Williams et al. 2015). Concerns of digital divide and social exclusion 
have yet to be addressed. 62  Second, participants will be asked for consent 
continuously because each new project requires fresh new consent to be given. 
Arguably a person may potentially receive hundreds of consent requests each year.
 63 
This is likely to cause routinization of consent behavior resulting in people not 
                                                                                                                                                              
The second is broad consent for “broader categories of research.” The third type is blanket 
consent and blanket refusal for one-off decisions concerning participation or non-participation in 
research. (Ploug and Holm 2016, 726). 
60 This includes data from electronic patient record, tissue/genomic data, health databases and 
linkage to non-health data (Ploug and Holm 2016) . 
61 Research context refers to private versus public, commercial versus non-commercial, and 
national vs international (Ploug and Holm 2016). 
62 (Williams et al. 2015) (Steinsbekk, Kåre Myskja, and Solberg 2013, 898) 
63 Ploug and Holm discusses the hypothetical experience of a resident of Denmark if specific 
consent is required for every secondary use of data. (Ploug and Holm 2016, 723) 
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reading the information and not reflecting the choice but simply choosing habitually 
to consent or refuse to give consent (Ploug and Holm 2016, 724). Although the 
refined model of meta consent allows opt-out or broad consent, it is skeptical whether 
such is allowed under the new European Union regime of GDPR, and whether it is 
considered a form of valid informed consent. Third, the dynamic consent model has 
seemingly passed control and choice to individual participants. Yet at the same time, 
it has also passed responsibility to them without ensuring that they have the required 
knowledge and competence to make informed decisions
 (Steinsbekk, Kåre Myskja, 
and Solberg 2013, 900). Steinsbekk et al have even argued that based on the above 
point, broad consent may be better than dynamic consent as independent review from 
research ethics committee is required in the former (Steinsbekk, Kåre Myskja, and 
Solberg 2013, 900). 
Overall, the open consent model and the dynamic consent model may have 
enabled better participation of participants but they remain largely information 
strategies. The mere passing of more information to participants, and the seeking of 
their indication at different stages of research do not necessarily amount to building a 
democratic and participatory model of medical research. Steinsbeek et al point out 
that the participation envisaged is limited as it is “participation inside an already 
established research arena where only minor changes of policy are up for 
discussion”(Steinsbekk, Kåre Myskja, and Solberg 2013, 900). Furthermore, at best, 
we have filled only part of the knowledge gap (mentioned at the end of Part II of this 
article) in enabling participants to find out more about the purposes of data collection, 
the persons who have been accessing their data and “empowering” them to have more 
control on how the data is being used down the stream of data re-use. The success of 
the two alternative models is dependent highly on how informed, competent, 
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knowledgeable and reflective of the participants to engage meaningfully. However, 
we have not addressed the nightmare scenario of what to do in case things go wrong. 
 
IV. Beyond Consent: The Model of Accountability 
Indisputably, consent plays an important role in health data research, but mere 
information disclosure and seeking of participants’ indication of choices do not 
guarantee respect and self-determination of individuals.  At most, the above suggested 
alternative consent frameworks have fulfilled the contractual ritual required in law 
(Felt et al. 2009, 101). They may have “managed” the legal concerns (Felt et al. 
2009, 102), but they have not resolved the problems of risks and harms not 
mentioned in the terms of agreement. Rather than shifting across different modes of 
consent and putting participants through strenuous, targeted exercise of choices and 
forms, the consent model should be complemented with an accountability model. 
 Big data technology has opened up undreamed of capacities to gain 
sophisticated understanding about the way that we can process and use data so as to 
organize our society and our lives. Those insights, unfortunately, can be pitfalls at the 
same time. Governments at different jurisdictions are eager to capture the benefits of 
big data but to weed out its harm
 
(van der Sloot and van Schendel 2016, 116–17).  In 
the present discussion, the medical sectors have used it to monitor disease and assist 
big data in clinical decision making. Yet the potential harms of big data technology 
should not be overlooked, especially when individuals’ personal lives are being 
affected significantly. When big data is used to define and construct identity, as in 
defining who a healthy citizen or employee is, issues of privacy and personal data 
protection, discrimination and exclusion, and procedural fairness are inevitably 
involved (Gutwirth and Hildebrandt 2010). One common fear related to identification 
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from health and medical data is insurance discrimination based on disease 
susceptibility (Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016, 316). Another fear is group-level of 
harm from analysis of aggregated data.64 This is considered to be more problematic as 
the stigmatization of the affected groups affects all members of the community, not 
only those who have given consent for their data to be used. Anonymized data 
subjects maybe grouped according to geographical, socio-economic, ethnic or other 
characteristic (Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016, 318). Indigenous groups have raised 
concerns on the risk that they will be singled out for discrimination in big data health 
research (Greely 2001). 
 Scholars have advocated for the incorporation of risk and harm assessment to 
tackle the problems of re-identification and discrimination in data privacy protection. 
Although they are writing in the larger context of cloud computing and big data 
technology, their proposed models on data driven accountability is equally applicable 
in our context of big data health research.65 
 
A. Risk Assessment of the Disclosure and Reuse of Data 
To ensure accountability, regulation of disclosure and reuse of personal data, 
including de-identified data,
66
 is necessary because third parties may identify the 
individuals concerned through data combination. This may lead to profiling, and the 
risks and adverse effects of profiling through data mining and data combination are 
well recognised.
67
 Data brokers have been collecting, analysing, selling and linking 
                                                        
64 (Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016) (Greely 2001) 
65 Part of the below discussion has been published in (Cheung 2015) 
66 De-identified data includes anonymized and pseudonymous data. The former refers to the 
personal data that been collected, altered or processed in such a way that it can no longer be 
attributed to the data subject; while the later refers to explicit identifier being replaced with 
codes. (Cheung 2015, 78–79) 
67 (Federal Trade Commission (US) 2016) (European Data Protection Supervisor 2015) 
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individual identities without our knowledge for some time.
68
 For example, Acxiom, 
largest data broker in the US and a marketing giant, holds an average of 1500 pieces 
of information on each of more than 200 million Americans.
69
 Also, it is estimated 
that each piece of information that users post on Facebook is worth five US cents and 
that each Facebook user is worth US$100 as a source of information.
70
 At present, 
there is limited regulation of the secondary use of data in most jurisdictions, 
particularly when they take the ostensible form of de-identified non-personal data. 
Ultimately, this is an issue of data security, relating to the obligations of data 
controllers to protect against unauthorised data access, use and disclosure by third 
parties.  
I am not advocating for a complete ban on the use of de-identified data. Indeed, 
there are legitimate reasons to reuse de-identified (pseudonymous) data,
71
 such as in 
pharmaceutical trials and medical data research or for other legitimate purposes that 
serve the public interest. In such cases, scholars have recommended that clear 
guidelines be set, with minimum standards established for the de-identification of 
datasets and independent reviews of the risk of re-identification before data 
disclosure.
72
 Many have advocated that a specific model be used to measure the 
continuum of risk involved. For example, Hon et al. and others use the “realistic risk 
of identification” as a benchmark, 73   whereas Schwartz and Solove suggest the 
                                                        
68 The FTC uses the term ‘data broker’ to refer to those that ‘collect and aggregate consumers’ personal 
information from a wide range of sources and resell it for an array of purposes, such as marketing, 
verifying an individual’s identity, and preventing financial fraud’. (Federal Trade Commission (US) 
2013). 
69 (Kroft 2014). 
70 (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, 119)  
71 Article 4(5) defines pseudonymisation to be “the processing of personal data in such a manner 
that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of 
additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is 
subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not 
attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.” 
72 (Hon, Millard, and Walden 2011, 215).  
73 (Hon, Millard, and Walden 2011, 224). 
23 
 
“substantial risk of being identified”(Schwartz and Solove 2011, 1882). More 
concretely, Ohm recommends that any risk assessment take account of (1) the data-
handling techniques used by database owners; (2) the nature of information release, 
with the public disclosure of data being subject to stricter scrutiny; (3) the quantity of 
data involved; (4) the likely motives and economic incentives for anyone to re-
identify the data; and (5) the trust culture in a particular industry or sector, that is, the 
existing standard of fiduciary duty or duty of confidentiality in that sector (Ohm 
2010). Furthermore, as data identification and combination technologies are 
advancing at a rapid pace, I contend that any risk assessment concerned should be 
carried out on a regular basis with citizen scientists being involved, rather than only at 
the data collection and de-identification and disclosure stages.  
 
B. Re-identification: Data Quality and Size  
When considering threats of re-identification external to the original research 
team or organizations, data quality and size also need to be taken into account. Data 
quality refers to the nature, sensitivity and linkability of data to individuals (Ohm 
2010, 1766), with the latter referring to the different degrees of data identifiability or 
levels of effort required to identify an individual. An example of good-quality data is 
the information presented in Google Flu Trends. Regardless of whether its predictions 
are accurate (Arthur 2014), the information that Google gathers from the online web 
search queries submitted by millions of individuals are abstracted at a high level and 
safely aggregated.74  
Another important element of data quality is data size. The size of a database is 
determinative of how easy it is to link the information therein to an individual. The 
                                                        
74 (Schwartz and Solove 2011, 1882)  
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larger in size it is, the easier that link is to make. However, the law seems to be silent 
on how much data data controllers may collect, how long they may retain them, what 
data may or may not be combined and whether stricter security measures are needed 
for large databases. Ohm argues that new quantitative limits and guidelines should be 
enacted to address these issues (Ohm 2010, 1767). Such limits and guidelines would 
undoubtedly have an impact on bio-banks given the vast quantity of data stored in 
there, but are certainly deserving of further consideration. 
In sum, in determining the likelihood of re-identification, we must also consider 
the quality and quantity of the data in question. Ultimately, the core issue in personal 
data protection is identity protection. 
 
C. Sensitive Data and Re-combination of Data  
Many of the foregoing measures are dependent on the compliance framework of the 
data controllers and the organisations or companies concerned because participants 
often have no idea that their data are being re-used and processed or that they have 
been re-identified. It is therefore important to formulate an alternative privacy 
framework that is based less on consent and more on holding data controllers 
accountable for a particular reuse of data based on risk and the likely adverse impact 
(harm) on data subjects when the unauthorised disclosure and use of data takes place.  
Namely, the European Union has a higher standard on the use of sensitive personal 
data which includes genetic, biometric and health data under the new GDPR, while 
the US regulates the combination of data. 
The EU affords sensitive personal data special protection. Recital 51 of the 
GDPR specifies that personal data “which by their nature, particularly sensitive in 
relation to fundamental rights and freedom merit specific protection as the context of 
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their processing could create significant risks to the fundamental freedoms or privacy” 
should not be processed unless the data subject gives his explicit consent. Although 
the categories of sensitive data are likely to be controversial in different contexts and 
cultures,
75
 the “sensitive” nature of certain data reveals the underlying values and 
harm concerned. For example, data related to an individual’s health (particularly 
sensitive health information such as HIV status) may lead to discrimination against 
that individual.
76
 Bearing in mind the threat of harm arising from the re-identification 
of certain data, organisations need to ensure that sensitive data, which may perhaps be 
better described as critical data, are stored separately from the general network. They 
also need to ensure that access to such data is carefully monitored, that their 
combination with other data cannot easily take place and that their public disclosure is 
impossible. 
Rather than imposing a high standard on a discrete category of sensitive data, 
there is special restriction on the combination of data in the US.  For instance, in 2013, 
California amended its law on personal information to include regulation of the 
practice of data combination by imposing new requirements on the operators of 
commercial websites or online services that collect the personal information of 
Californian consumers.77 Under amended s.1798.29 of the California Civil Code, the 
definition of personal information has been expanded to include an individual’s first 
name or first initial and last name in combination with any one or more of five stated 
                                                        
75 Article 9 of the EU GDPR prohibits the processing of personal data revealing “racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of 
genetic data, biometric data for the purposes of uniquely identifying the natural person, data concerning 
health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation,” unless data subjects provide 
their explicit consent or other conditions under article 9(2) are satisfied. 
76 It was recently reported that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been collecting racial 
and ethnic information to map communities around the country based on crude stereotypes about which 
groups commit various types of crime. (Gangadharan and Vitka 2014). 
77 Personal Information: Privacy SB-46 (2013-2014) reg sess, ch 396, Cal Stat (enacted) 
<http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB46> accessed 28 
March 2014. 
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categories of data fields if any is unencrypted: (1) social security number, (2) driver’s 
licence number or California identification card number, (3) bank account number or 
credit or debit card number in combination with any required security code, access 
code or password that would permit access to an individual’s financial records, (4) 
medical information and (5) health insurance information.78 The definition also now 
includes a username or email address in combination with a password or security 
question and answer that would permit access to an online account.79 All of this 
information is subject to a specific duty of notice of breach and security 
requirement. 80  California’s approach to regulating the combination of certain 
categories of unencrypted information constitutes a move in the right direction. 
The emphasis is rightly on non-attribution to a specific data subject without the 
use of additional information, as long as such additional information is kept separately 
and subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure non-attribution.81 In 
addition, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recommended a more robust 
system of de-identification and accountability. 82  Rather than toiling with various  
concepts of de-identified data (anonymous, anonymised and pseudonymous data), the 
FTC acknowledges that the de-identification of data is not fool proof, and thus there is 
always a possibility that individuals will be re-identified. Accordingly, it recommends 
that companies robustly de-identify, and publicly commit to making no attempts to re-
identify, data, and contractually require the same public commitment from any 
downstream users with which they share information. Such requirements should 
extend to the sharing of data with third parties owing to the possibility of subsequent 
attribution by later parties. 
                                                        
78 Cal Civ Code s 1798.29(g)(1). 
79 Cal Civ Code s 1798.29(g)(2). 
80 Cal Civ Code ss 1798.29 and 1798.82. 
81Recital 29 of the GDPR governs the measures on the use of pseudonymous data. 
82 (Federal Trade Commission (US) 2012, 21–22). 
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Conclusion 
Big data and information communication technologies hold great promises for 
health and medical citizen science. Citizen scientists can connect and exchange data 
with one another and with researchers. This has led to growing expectations to access 
and re-use the data in bio-banks and repositories. In grappling with the shifting nature 
of data and ever-evolving technology, various notions of consent has been formulated 
to resolve the tension between researchers’ need for data and subject’s will for 
privacy and self-determination. Yet all the attempts to re-fine and re-define consent 
have proved to be futile conquest of individual’s full autonomy. 
Embedded in big data analytics is the use of data and personal data, and the 
matching of data sets. Arguably one does not have enough data and medical science 
literacy to give meaningful consent to research involving such technology. To most 
participants, their consent may have reproduced their dependency on expert 
researchers, medical or state authorities. Regardless whether it is open or dynamic and 
with variations in between, consent gives only an illusion of control in the big data 
age. Despite the fact that the formulations of consent may be compatible with existing 
legal standards, they may be far-cry from ethical imperatives to personal dignity, 
equality and democratic accountability. Its layered meanings often come with a 
broader shift of unsolicited responsibility from public healthcare authorities, 
commercial actors or institutional researchers to individual participants. Regulators 
have warned that the transfer of risk and regulation should not “signal a reduction in 
the standards and quality of healthcare provision”(European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies to the European Commission 2015, 62). What lies 
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behind seemingly empowerment of citizens should not be a disguised form of 
exploitation of extraction and sale of personal data, which may lead to discrimination 
against individuals or groups. 
While consent is still essential in medical and health research, it must be 
assured by a complementary system of data driven accountability. Consent alone is 
not enough to restore autonomy to individual and citizen scientists in fast evolving 
data-intensive research. As there are different dimensions and forms of citizen science, 
so should the participation of citizen scientists at various stages of research following 
the life cycle of data usage including risk and harm assessment, re-identification are-
combination of data. The solution to attain autonomy must come through a 
comprehensive set of citizen science practice involving data research. 
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